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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Nationwide Insurance Company 
Plaintiff-Respondent/ 
vs. 
PEREIDOUN E. POURMIRZAIE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890563-CA 
(Priority No. 14b) 
BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction in this court is predicated upon Section 78-
2-2(3)(j), U.C.A. (1953, as amended 1988). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a verdict in a civil trial 
awarding the respondent actual and punitive damages on a claim of 
fraud. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The lower court erred in refusing to grant a 
mistrial. 
2. The lower court erred in permitting the jury to award 
punitive damages by a preponderance of the evidence. 
3. The lower court erred in awarding the respondent 
attorney's fees. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. 
Rules 403, 404 and 406, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 39, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Section 78-18-1, U.C.A. (1953, as amended). 
Section 78-27-56, U.C.A. (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. This was a civil action for 
fraud in which the respondent sought damages for a false insurance 
claim together with punitive damages. 
b. Course of proceedings. The respondent's complaint 
was filed on July 16, 1987 (R. 2). A jury trial was held on 
January 17 and 18, 1989. 
c. Disposition in the lower court. The jury entered a 
special verdict on January 18, 1989, finding that the defendant had 
defrauded the plaintiff and awarding the plaintiff $29,150.00 in 
compensatory damages and $10,000.00 in punitive damages (R. 115). 
The Court subsequently entered judgment for those amounts plus 
$12,155.00 in interest, $263.60 in costs and $8,385.50 in 
attorney's fees (R. 173-174). 
d. Statement of facts. The facts necessary to decide 
this case, including citations to the record, are contained in the 
argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The references by the respondent to the appellant's 
nationality, a purported effort on his part to pay someone to marry 
him and unrelated, alleged criminal activity by him warranted a 
mistrial. 
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2. The lower court should have instructed the jury that 
punitive damages must be proven by clear and convincing evidence 
rather than the preponderance standard. 
3. The lower court erred in awarding the respondent 
attorney's fees for three reasons. Firstf the appellant was denied 
his right to a jury trial on this issue. Second, the Court failed 
to find that the appellant's defense was in bad faith and without 
merit, the necessary prerequisites for such an award. Third, even 
if it can be concluded that the defense was in bad faith and 
meritless, the lower court failed to apportion the fees sought 
between those which were incurred by reason of the defense and 
those which would have been incurred under any circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A 
MISTRIAL. 
The respondent's counsel told the jury in her opening 
statement that in two years the appellant ". . .had set a record 
for frequency of claims, amount of claims and the sequence of 
claims, in that the car—he would add a car to the policy one week 
and the next week make a claim on it. These are fairly unusual 
claims," (Transcript, p. 7). She went on to say that two months 
after the car which is the subject of this action had been reported 
stolen, ". . .we got a claim. . .that his BMW had been stolen. So, 
after the BMW theft, we took a sworn statement from [him],w (Id.). 
Later, when the appellant testified, the respondent's counsel asked 
him if he had paid an American woman to marry him for citizenship 
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purposes/ to which the appellant promptly objected (T. 17),. The 
respondent attempted to ask another witness about other claims paid 
to the appellant which were ". . .later found out to be untrue/1 
(T. 119). The theory counsel argued for admission of these "other 
claims" was predicated upon Rule 406, U.R.E. (T. 127). Counsel 
argued that the other claims would show a "routine or practice" of 
filing false claims. No effort was then made to substantiate that 
argument. Finally, when the appellant recalled a witness for the 
respondent, that witness volunteered that the appellant's name had 
been found on documents linked to unrelated criminal activity (T. 
167). The appellant twice moved for a mistrial on the basis of all 
these statements (T. 125, 169). Each time the motion was denied. 
The lower court erred in refusing to grant the motions. 
"A mistrial should be granted only when it appears that justice 
will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial 
granted," Watkiss & Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 
1979). The cumulative effect of the respondent's efforts was to 
"thwart justice." 
The appellant is an Iranian, not presently America's 
favorite ethnic group. Having established his origin, the 
respondent then attempted to prove he had once paid a woman to 
marry him so he could become a citizen four years before the events 
giving rise to this case occurred. The respondent,, by its counsel 
and witnesses, attempted to portray the appellant as having the 
most suspicious claims history in the annals of Nationwide 
Insurance. The respondent's primary witness took it upon himself 
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to simply volunteer that the appellantfs name had been linked to 
other perhaps similar criminal activity. All of these statements 
and testimony were inadmissible under Rules 403 and 404, U.R.E.f 
as the Court below correctly ruled. However, in refusing to grant 
the mistrial motions, the Court chose to ignore the cumulative 
effect of the respondent's actions. 
The respondent managed to convey to the jury that an 
Iranian had paid a woman to become a citizen; that he was the most 
suspicious client in the history of a major insurance company; and 
that he was involved in unrelated, possibly similar criminal 
activity. None of this had anything to do with the issues before 
the jury who heard the trial, yet all of it could only prejudice 
the jurors against the appellant. Applying the principle of the 
Watkiss & Faber case, it appears here that "justice was thwarted" 
and the motion should have been granted. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY 
TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY A PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE. 
In the event that this Court concludes it was not error 
to refuse to grant a mistrial, it should nevertheless reverse the 
award of punitive damages. The jury was instructed that the 
standard of proof in awarding punitive damages was preponderance 
of the evidence (R. 108, 109). The special verdict form contained 
the same language (R. 116). The appellant contended that the 
burden of proof was by clear and convincing evidence (T. 174). The 
appellant's position states the correct standard. 
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Oddly, no Utah case seems to have addressed this issue. 
However, this Court has recognized that "In order to recover 
punitive damages, a party must prove conduct that is willful and 
malicious or that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and disregard of, the rights of others. (Citations 
omitted.)" Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P. 2d 950, 967 
(Utah App. 1989). The Arizona Supreme Court, in Linthicum v. 
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P. 2d 675 (1986), directly confronted 
the quantum of proof of such conduct as described in Arnica which 
would be required before punitive damages could be awarded. 
The Linthicum court wrote, 
As this remedy is only to be awarded in 
the most egregious of cases, where there is 
reprehensible conduct combined with an evil 
mind over and above that required for commis-
sion of a tort, we believe it is appropriate 
to impose a more stringent standard of proof. 
When punitive damages are loosely assessed, 
they become onerous not only to defendants but 
the public as a whole. Additionally, its 
deterrent impact is lessened. Therefore, while 
a plaintiff may collect compensatory damages 
upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
of his injuries due to the tort of another, we 
conclude that recovery of punitive damages 
should be awardable only upon clear and 
convincing evidence of the defendant's evil 
mind. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A. 2d at 1362-
1363. In making this distinction, we are not 
alone. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Raymond, supra; 
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442 
N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982); Wangen v. Ford Motor 
Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); 
Or.Rev.Stat. §30.925 (1981); Minn.Stat.Ann. 
§549.20 (1984); See also Colo.Rev.Stat. §13-
25-127(2) (1973) (proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for 
Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 
Va.L.Rev. 269, 296-298 (1983) (recommending 
such a higher standard). We hpld that the 
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burden of proof for punitive damages is by 
clear and convincing evidence, 
723 P.2d 675, 681. 
It is to be noted that four months after the trial of 
this action. Section 78-18-1, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), took 
effect. That statute expressly states that proof of punitive 
damages shall be by clear and convincing evidence. This Court 
should adopt the spirit of that statute and the reasoning of 
Linthicum by holding the burden of proof in this state for punitive 
damages to be clear and convincing evidence. To rule otherwise 
would lead to the peculiar result of requiring a much higher burden 
for proof of fraud than is required for the attendant, and severe, 
punitive damages. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Again, if this Court rules that the denial of the 
mistrial motions was correct, then it should nevertheless consider 
whether it was error to award the respondent attorney's fees. The 
appellant contends it was error for any of three separate reasons. 
A. Denial of jury trial. 
The respondent was awarded attorney's fees in the sum of 
$8,385.50 (R. 174). The award was not made by the jury but was 
based on a post-trial affidavit (R. 123-124). The respondent 
argued that the appellant's counsel stipulated to such a procedure 
(R. 156). The appellant's former counsel denied any such agreement 
and argued that an award of fees was a jury question. The lower 
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court's award of fees without the participation of the jury was 
improper. 
It is not necessary for this Court to resolve whether it 
was or was not agreed that fees could be awarded by the court 
rather than the jury. No such agreement appears in the record of 
this case. Rule 39(a)(1), U.R.C.P., provides in pertinent part 
that after a jury is demanded, the ". . atrial of all issues so 
demanded shall be by jury, unless (1) The parties or their 
attorneys of tecord, by written stipulation filed with the court 
or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the 
record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a 
jury. . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
In the absence of an "oral stipulation. . .entered in the 
record," this Court cannot assume the appellant waived his right 
to a jury trial on the issue of fees. 
B. Failure to make appropriate findings. 
In order to award fees under Section 78-27-56, "a trial 
court must make findings that 1) the claim or claims were 'without 
merit,' and 2) the party's conduct was lacking in good faith," 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, supra, at 966. The lower court 
here made no such findings, nor does the judgment, drafted by the 
respondent, contain them. Therefore, no such award should be made. 
C. Failure to apportion fees. 
Section 78-27-56(1), U.C.A. (1953, as amended), permits 
fees to be awarded only to the extent that the ". . .defense to the 
action was without merit and in bad faith." Here, the lower 
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courtfs judgment awards fees for the entire time that respondent 
was represented by counsel. No showing was made a§ to what 
portion, if any, of the fee was necessitated by the purported bad 
faith/meritless defense raised by the appellant. Yet, that is the 
only portion for which the statute permits recovery. The Arnica 
decision, supra, at 966, makes clear that such a failure is 
reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant a new trial based upon the lower 
court's failure to grant a mistrial. If it chooses not to do so, 
then the award of punitive damages should be reversed because the 
jury was incorrectly instructed as to the burden of proof. The 
award of attorney's fees should be reversed for any of the reasons 
stated above. 
Dated this ^ day of June, 1990. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to Joy 
L. Sanders, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, on the 
_ day of June, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. [jo 
In addition to compensatory damages, under certain cir-
cumstances the law permits the jury to award an injured party 
punitive damages. Punitive damages punish a wrongdoer and 
serve as a warning to others not to engage in such conduct. 
The jury may award a plaintiff punitive damages in this 
case if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff has been damaged as a result of acts or omissions of 
the defendant done either willfully or maliciously, or with 
reckless indifference toward and disregard of that plaintiff's 
rights. An act or omission is done willfully if it is done 
intentionally. An act or a failure to act is "maliciously" 
done if it is prompted or accompanied by ill will, spite, or 
grudge. "Recklessly" means wantonly, with indifference to 
consequences. If a person makes a representation without 
knowing whether it is true or not, or makes it without regard 
to its truth or falsity or to its possible consequences, he may 
be found to have made the representation recklessly. 
ADDENDUM 2 
R U B B1ST5UCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAH 1 8 1389 
M.T^KEXipUNTY 
By — >fT" o*puty Cfcrk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONWIDE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
FEREIDOUN Eo POURMIRZAIE, Civil No. C-87-04820 
Defendant. (Judge David S. Young) 
We, the Jury in the above-entitled action, find as 
follows: 
1. Did the defendant defraud plaintiff? 
Yes & 
No ^ 
If you answered the foregoing question wyes,w the Court 
will award plaintiff compensatory damages of $29,150.00 and 
you may answer question no# 2. If you answered the foregoing 
question wno,M then do not answer question no. 2. 
20 Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant ought to be punished and that plaintiff is entitled 
to punitive damages? 
Yes ft 
No /^ 
If you answered the foregoing question "yes," you may 
answer question no. 3. 
3o What amount of punitive damages, if any, should be 
awarded plaintiff? 
$ 16 ooo -
DATED this } jjf day of January, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
^""\ ., .iD'.slr.ct 
,r>^"":-t0l'''1>' 
By- .W.V,J-W •."•era 
RAYMOND M. BERRY, A0310 
JOY L. SANDERS, A4138 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
av4lr^MM 
NATIONWIDE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
FEREIDOUN E. POURMIRZAIE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
Civil No. C-87-04820 
(Judge David S. Young) 
O-^ Vv-x 
This case came on regularly for trial on January 17 and 18, 
1989/ the Honorable David S. Young presiding. The plaintiff was 
represented by Joy L. Sanders of Snow, Christensen & Martineau; 
the defendant was represented by Herschel Bullen of McDonald & 
Bullen. The Jury found on Special Verdict that defendant had 
defrauded plaintiff. The Court had previously instructed the 
Jury that in the event they found that defendant had defrauded 
plaintiff the Court would award plaintiff compensatory 
damages of $29,150.00. The Jury further found on the special 
verdict by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant ought 
to be punished and that plaintiff was entitled to punitive 
damages in the amount of $10,000*00. 
The parties had previously stipulated that the issue of 
attorney's fees and interest would be reserved for the Court 
after the Jury returned its verdict. Plaintiff is entitled 
to interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum from July 24, 
1985, on the compensatory damages of $29,150.00, for a total 
amount of interest of $12,155.00 as of January 23, 1989. 
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements 
filed herewith, the Court finds that the defendant must pay 
costs in the amount of $2 63.60. 
Pursuant to the Affidavit of Joy L. Sanders filed herewith, 
the Court finds that the defendant must pay attorney's fees 
in the amount of $8,385.50. 
In summary, therefore, the Court finds that the plaintiff 
is entitled to special damages in the amount of $29,150.00, plus 
prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $12,155.00 as of 
January 23, 1989, plus punitive damages of $10,000.00, plus 
attorney's fees of $8,385.50, and costs of $263.60. 
Now, therefore, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed 
that: 
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JUDGMENT be, and hereby is, entered in favor of the 
plaintiff, Nationwide Insurance Company, and against the 
defendant, Fereidoun E. Pourmirzaie, in the sum of $59,954.10, 
with interest thereon at the rate of 12 percent per annum 
from the date hereof until paid. 
DATED this /3 ^ ay of fl/tlLt 6-R , 1989 . 
David S. Young 
District Coidxt iudc 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MCDONALD & BULLEN 
By. 
Herschel Bullen 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Cheryl A. Hunter, being first duly sworn, states that she is 
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for Plaintiff 
herein, that she served the attached Proposed Judgment on 
Special Verdict 
in Civil No. C-87-04820 , Salt Lake Co. Third District Court 
upon the following parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
HERSCHEL BULLEN 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on 
the 2 4 t h day of January
 f/1989. 
(^> lany^KQyM ^s* 1
 Corr.fPistion < ^ 
Expires7--,'-32 O^UBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e tfni on t h i s 24th day of 
f!A L. GA,».:: r-gLLg January , 1989 . ^ //I ^/3y 
SJJ'L.M CMV ^Sojmnission E x p i r e s : ISK^//^L^SPC^ 
, ui 64m ,^/f Notary P u b l i c 
ADDENDUM 4 
Rule 403 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of remoteness. 
Irrelevant evidence. 
Probability evidence. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
Discretion of court. 
The trial court is given considerable discre-
tion in deciding whether or not evidence sub-
mitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
Effect of remoteness. 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979). 
Irrelevant evidence. 
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another 
participant in the crime had no bearing on de-
fendant's guilt or innocence and was properly 
excluded as not relevant to defendant's partici-
pation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667 
P.2d 586 (Utah 1983). 
Probability evidence. 
Courts have routinely excluded probability 
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to 
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical 
conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence 
before it and decide where truth lies. State v 
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
Scientific evidence. 
The Frye test (that scientific tests still in the 
experimental stages should not be admitted in 
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced 
from a well recognized scientific principle or 
discovery is admissible if the scientific princi-
ple is sufficiently established) is a valid test, 
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for 
determining when scientific evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted and is not incon-
sistent with Rules 402, 403, and 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Kofford v. Flora, 744 
P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987). 
Standard of review. 
The judgment of the trial court admitting or 
excluding evidence will not be reversed unless 
it is shown that the discretion exercised 
therein has been abused. Terry v. Zions Coop. 
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — United States v. 
Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the 
Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839. 
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA 
Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evalu-
ation test results or of statements made during 
test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202. 
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior 
misidentification of accused in connection with 
commission of crime similar to that presently 
charged, 50 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Products liability: admissibility of evidence 
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th 
1186. 
Thermographic tests: admissibility of test re-
sults in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1105. 
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination 
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143. 
Products liability: admissibility of experi-
mental or test evidence to disprove defect in 
motor vehicle, 64 A.L.R.4th 125. 
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence 
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary blood-
stains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588. 
Rule 403, Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402. 
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ADDENDUM 5 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 404 
A.L.R. — Noncharacter witnesses in civil 
case, limiting number of, 5 A.L.R.3d 169. 
Noncharacter witnesses in criminal case, 
limiting number of, 5 A.L.R.3d 238. 
Character or reputation witnesses, propriety 
and prejudicial effect of trial court's limiting 
number of, 17 A.L.R.3d 327. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim. Provisions of this 
rule apply to character evidence to prove con-
duct, as distinguished from proof of character 
where character is an essential element of a 
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see 
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was 
comparable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d 
703 (Utah 1977) (character evidence as to the 
character of the victim of a homicide was ad-
missible to rebut the defendant's contention 
that the deceased was the aggressor). One sig-
nificant difference between this rule and Rule 
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there 
is no provision for the use of character evidence 
in civil cases, except where character is the 
ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 
Evidence offered by defendant at federal 
criminal trial as inadmissible, under Rule 403 
of Federal Rules of Evidence, on ground that 
probative value is substantially outweighed by 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, 
or misleading the jury, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 700. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence «=» 143. 
authorized the use of character evidence in 
civil cases not only on the ultimate issue but 
where otherwise substantively relevant. See 
Boyce, Character Evidence: The Substantive 
Use, 4 Utah Bar J. 13, 18-19 (1976). However, 
Rule 48, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) ex-
pressly excluded character evidence with re-
spect to a trait as to care or skill. The Advisory 
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
concluded that the remaining justification for 
the admission of character evidence was so in-
significant that character evidence in civil 
cases should not be admitted unless it was in 
issue. 
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v. For-
syth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce, 
Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5 
Utah Bar J. 31 (1977). 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove con-
duct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted 
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his charac-
ter offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that 
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 39 
Bight preserved. 
—Appeal from industrial commission. 
This trial rule is not applicable to trial de 
novo in the district court on appeal from indus-
trial commission's decision on a sex discrimi-
nation in employment case. Beehive Medical 
Elecs., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1978). 
—Court's discretion. 
In circumstances where doubt exists as to 
whether a cause should be regarded as one in 
equity or one in law, wherein the party can 
insist on a jury as a matter of right, the trial 
court should have some discretion and may ex-
amine the nature of the rights asserted and the 
remedies sought in the light of the facts of the 
case to ascertain which predominates and, 
from that determination, make the appropriate 
order as to a jury or nonjury trial. Corbet v. 
Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P.2d 1318 (1974). 
Waiver. 
—Failure to make written demand. 
Failure to make a written demand for a jury 
trial upon the opposing party waives any error 
in a court's failure to grant a jury trial. Gasser 
v. Home, 557 P.2d 154 (Utah 1976). 
Cited in Stickle v. Union Pac. R.R., 122 
Utah 477, 251 P.2d 867 (1952); Best v. Huber, 
3 Utah 2d 177, 281 P.2d 208 (1955); Hansen v. 
Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 10, 
57 to 69, 71, 81, 82, 84 to 89. 
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 10, 84 to 113. 
A.L.R. — Obtaining jury trial in eminent 
domain; waiver, 12 A.L.R.3d 7. 
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counter-
claim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321. 
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or 
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393. 
Statute reducing number of jurors as viola-
tive of right to trial by jury, 47 A.L.R.3d 895. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties. 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Right to jury trial in stockholder's derivative 
action, 32 A.L.R.4th 1111. 
Right to jury trial in action for declaratory 
relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th 146. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
A.L.R.4th 565. 
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory 
discharge from employment, 52 A.L.R.4th 
1141. 
Right to jury trial in state court divorce pro-
ceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955. 
Validity of law or rule requiring state court 
party who requests jury trial in civil case to 
pay costs associated with jury, 68 A.L.R.4th 
343. 
Rule 38 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
waived right to jury trial as revived by 
amended or supplemental pleadings, 18 A.L.R. 
Fed. 754. 
Key Numbers, — Jury <&=> 10, 25 to 28. 
Rule 39, Trial by jury or by the court, 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, 
the action shall be designated upon the register of actions as a jury action. The 
trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed 
with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in 
the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury, or 
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of 
trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist, or 
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 
38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to 
demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of 
right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any 
or all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not triable of right 
by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with 
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an advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a 
jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of 
right. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 39, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Advisory jury. 
—Equity. 
Trial by consent. 
—Equity. 
Motion for directed verdict. 
Trial by court. 
—Waiver of court trial. 
—Waiver of jury trial. 
Trial by jury. 
—Grant of jury trial. 
——Absence of demand. 
—Right. 
——Quiet title action. 
Cited. 
Advisory jury. 
—Equity. 
When there is a demand for a jury trial in an 
equity case, the jury will serve only in an advi-
sory capacity unless both parties have clearly 
consented to accept a jury verdict. Romrell v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 
1980). 
Trial court did not commit prejudicial error 
by allowing a jury to sit in an equity proceed-
ing where the jury was retained merely as an 
advisory jury to consider the sole question of 
the reasonableness of plaintiffs reliance on de-
fendant's act. Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Pav-
ing & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984). 
Trial by consent 
—Equity. 
Motion for directed verdict. 
Where the case was essentially one in equity 
but the parties and court appeared to have con-
sented to presenting their case to a jury whose 
verdict would have "the same effect as if trial 
by jury had been a matter of right," under Sub-
division (c), the determination of whether a di-
rected verdict was proper was to be tested by 
the same rules governing cases at law. Willard 
v. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607 (Utah 
1978). 
Trial by court 
—Waiver of court trial. 
Even though former statute providing for 
trial by court in absence of demand for jury 
was couched in mandatory terms, and a party 
might have an absolute right to have the is-
sues tried by the court, the right could be 
waived, as by proceeding to trial before a jury. 
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 47 
Utah 215, 152 P. 726 (1915). 
—Waiver of jury trial. 
Where it did not appear that any demand for 
a jury trial was made, or that any objection or 
exception was made at any time during trial 
against right of the court to try the case with-
out a jury, it would be presumed on appeal that 
a trial by jury was waived. Perego v. Dodge, 9 
Utah 3,33 P. 221 (1893), aff d, 163 U.S 160,16 
S. Ct. 971, 41 L. Ed. 113 (1896). 
Trial by jury. 
—Grant of jury trial. 
Absence of demand. 
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
jury trial to defendant, under this rule, over 
plaintiffs objections although defendant had 
not made proper demand for jury trial under 
Rule 38, where plaintiff was not prejudiced 
thereby. James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964). 
—Right 
Quiet title action. 
This rule gives the right to have any legal 
issue of fact tried by a jury upon proper de-
mand, and plaintiff in an action to quiet title to 
mining claims was entitled to a jury trial on 
issues of fact. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 
327 P.2d 250 (1958). 
Cited in Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 
6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956). 
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ADDENDUM 7 
78-18-1 JUDICIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 18 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
Section Section 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards 78-18-2. Drug exception. 
— Section inapplicable to DUI 
cases — Division of award with 
state. 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section in-
applicable to DUI cases — Division of award with 
state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of 
Subsection (a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out 
of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily intoxi-
cated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and 
drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible 
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of 
the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into 
the General Fund. 
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L. punitive damages that arise on or after May 1, 
1989, ch. 237, § 1. 1989. 
Applicability. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4 Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4 
provides that the act applies to all claims for makes the act effective on May 1, 1989. 
78-18-2. Drug exception. 
(1) Punitive damages may not be awarded if a drug causing the claimant's 
harm: 
(a) received premarket approval or licensure by the Federal Food and 
Drug Administration under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. Section 301 et seq. or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 
Section 201 et seq.; 
(b) is generally recognized as safe and effective under conditions estab-
lished by the Federal Food and Drug Administration and applicable regu-
lations, including packaging and labeling regulations. 
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ADDENDUM 8 
78-27-51 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: L. 1977, ch. 143, § 1; 1989, ch. 
241, § 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 1,1989, added the subsec-
A.L.R. — Credit card issuer's liability, un-
der state laws, for wrongful billing, cancella-
tion, dishonor, or disclosure, 53 A.L.R.4th 231. 
A.L.R. — Ski resort's liability for skier's in-
juries resulting from condition of ski run or 
slope, 55 A.L.R.4th 632. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the 
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not 
otherwise provided by statute or agreement" 
ANALYSIS 
Findings. 
Cited. 
Findings. 
Under this section, a trial court must make 
findings that: (1) the claim or claims were 
"without merit," and (2) the party did not act 
tion designations, added Subsection (2Kb), sub-
stituted "section" for "act" in Subsection (3), 
and made stylistic changes. 
following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); sub-
stituted "shall" for "may" following "the court" 
in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsec-
tion (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added 
Subsection (2). 
in good faith. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Cited in Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 
(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 
1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush, 
744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v. 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d 
60 (Utah 1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 102 
Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-27-51. Inherent risks of skiing — Public policy. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees 
under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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